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NOTE
IS RANDOM SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING IN THE SCHOOLS
REASONABLE? AN ANALYSIS OF VERNONIA SCHOOL
DISTRICT 47J V. ACTON'
INTRODUCIrON
In the fall of 1991, twelve-year old James Acton, a seventh-grader at
Washington Grade School in Vernonia, Oregon, tried out for and was
chosen to be a member of the football team. At the first practice, he
and other team members were given consent forms to be signed by
the students and their parents permitting school officials to test the
athletes' urine for the presence of illicit drugs.2 Because James and his
parents chose not to sign the form, James was suspended from inter-
scholastic athletics for the season, despite the undisputed fact that he
was not using drugs. Additionally, there was no reason to suspect he
ever had used drugs.3 The Actons filed an action in federal court4
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the drug
testing policy, which required mandatory random urinalysis for partic-
ipation in interscholastic athletics, violated James' constitutionally
guaranteed right to be free from unreasonable government searches.5
The trial court upheld the policy, and the Actons appealed. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding
that the policy was unconstitutional. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari6 and overturned the decision of the court of
appeals.7
Several cases decided prior to Acton have examined whether ran-
dom drug testing of student athletes which is not based on suspicion
that a particular individual has used drugs, and found such testing to
be unconstitutional. The decisions have been mixed, with some courts
1. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
2. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1994).
3. Id.
4. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist, 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992).
5. Id.
6. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1527.
7. Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386.
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upholding random suspicionless drug testing' and other courts finding
that such testing is unconstitutionalf Although the courts are in
agreement that chemical analysis of urine constitutes a search,10 the
debate centers around the circumstances under which the search can
be considered reasonable - in essence, where the line should be
drawn between reasonable and unreasonable searches."
This note will consider random suspicionless drug testing and the
decisions reached in Acton by the District Court of Oregon, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. It
will examine prior decisions on this issue where distinctions have been
made between reasonable and unreasonable searches, and will con-
sider the effects of the Acton decision on the future of drug testing
and student athletic programs.
Ti CASE
Vernonia, Oregon is a small, somewhat remote community of ap-
proximately 3,000 people where logging is the predominant industry.
Because of its size and relative isolation, opportunities for entertain-
ment are fairly limited, and local athletic competitions play a domi-
nant role in the social fabric of the community.1 2 Approximately 75%
8. See, eg., Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding
that drug testing of student athletes was reasonable because the school had a legitimate interest
in ensuring its athletes were drug-free, and the privacy interest of the students was diminished
both by the communal nature of locker rooms and by the annual physical examinations which
include urinalysis); Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (holding that
a student's already diminished expectation of privacy was outweighed by the NCAA's legitimate
interest in ensuring fair and vigorous competition and protecting the health and safety of student
athletes); O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997 (W.D. Wash.1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding the NCAA's random drug testing as a reason-
able search because reducing drug use among athletes outweighs the invasion of the individual's
right to privacy).
9. See, e.g., Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex.
1989) (holding that a program, which required drug testing of all students who participated in
any extracurricular activity, was unconstitutional because of the large number of students who
would be tested, the minimal evidence of a drug problem among students, and the magnitude of
the privacy interest invaded); University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993) (holding
that the university's random suspicionless urine testing program was invalid in the absence of
voluntary consent).
10. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) ("Because it is
clear that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society
has long recognized as reasonable, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded unanimously,
and we agree, that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment.").
11. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) ("The Fourth Amendment does
not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable."). United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) ("What is reasonable.., depends on all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself".).
12. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356.
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of elementary school students and 60-65% of high school students
participate in district sponsored athletic programs.' 3
Vernonia School District runs two schools, Washington Grade
School and Vernonia High School. Prior to 1985, teachers exper-
ienced few discipline problems and were not aware of much drug and
alcohol use by students.'4 Between 1985 and 1989 both teachers and
members of the administration perceived an increase in discipline
problems and an apparent simultaneous increase in student drug use.
Athletic coaches noticed an increase in the number and severity of
injuries which they attributed to drug use.'5 The teachers began to
feel concerned and helpless when sudents increasingly expressed in-
terest in using drugs.16 When administrators investigated, they con-
cluded that the advocates of this new trend were also the leading
student athletes, and they began to fear that the very center of activity
for both the school and the community was threatened.' 7
School officials attempted to deter drug use through educational
programs, but concluded that they were achieving little, if any, posi-
tive result.'" Soon they perceived that disciplinary problems had
reached "epidemic proportions,"' 9 and in 1988, they began to consider
drug testing. Officials investigated similar programs used in other
parts of the nation. They obtained legal counsel and held parent
meetings. After submitting to the School Board a plan which had
been unanimously approved at one of the parent meetings, and which
both administrators and superintendent had also approved, school of-
ficials began to implement a drug testing program (the "Policy"). 20
As a prerequisite for participation in interscholastic athletics, the
Policy requires students (and their parents) to sign a form authorizing
the District to conduct tests on urine specimens provided by the stu-
dent athletes. Testing is done at the beginning of the season in which
13. Id.
14. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1516.
15. Id. At a wrestling match, an athlete was injured when he failed to execute a well-drilled
basic safety maneuver. When the coach went to check on him the next day, the student's motel
room (which he was sharing with three other students) smelled of marijuana. Respondent's
Brief, 1995 WL 89313, at *7.
16. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356. Students bragged about using drugs. One veteran teacher
who had never experienced disciplinary problems before was ready to resign because of out-
bursts of misbehavior, profane language in class, rude and obscene statements toward other
students, and a flagrant attitude towards discipline.
17. Id. at 1357.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1358.
3
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the athlete will compete, and repeated randomly throughout the sea-
son."1 The production of the specimen is fairly closely monitored.23
When James Acton joined the football team in 1991, he willingly
submitted to the prerequisite physical exam, which included produc-
ing a urine specimen. However, after he discussed the consent form
for drug testing with his parents, they decided not to sign it, objecting
to the Policy because it mandated urinalysis in the absence of any indi-
cation that James had ever used drugs or alcohol. They took their
concerns to the principal and the superintendent, both of whom con-
firmed that James could not participate in district-sponsored sports
without a signed consent form. 3 James' parents brought an action in
Federal District Court claiming that the Policy violated their son's
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion 4 and the Oregon Constitution. 5 The trial court upheld the Pol-
icy, and the Actons appealed.
Before discussing the substantive issues, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether the case should be decided
based on the United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution.
The court noted that it had previously held that when the state and
federal constitutional provisions are similar or "coextensive," a claim
can be decided based on the federal constitution which will also de-
cide the state constitutional issue.26 If they are not coextensive, and
the state constitution gives greater protection, the case must be de-
cided based on the state constitution. In Acton, the Oregon court held
that the language of the two constitutions is nearly identical, and
21. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1516. Names are placed in a "pool" and each week approximately
10% of the student-athletes' names are drawn by a student supervised by two adults. Acton, 796
F. Supp. at 1358. Students can be asked to produce specimens before school, after school, be-
tween classes, or they can be pulled out of class.
22. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517. Boys go to the boy's locker room and, while standing at a urinal,
produce a specimen in a cup. A male monitor accompanies them and waits twelve to fifteen feet
away. Although the monitor "do[es] not always watch," (emphasis added) they do listen "for
the normal sounds of urination." Girls go to the office of the director of girls' athletics, and are
allowed to produce a specimen in an enclosed stall. After the urine sample has been produced,
the monitor checks it for temperature and indications of tampering, and then pours it into a vial
which is sent to a lab for actual testing. Id.
23. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359.
24. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25. "No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." OR. CONST. art I § 9.
26. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1518.
1996]
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noted that the Oregon courts had previously ruled that any differences
are inconsequential.27
Relying on both Oregon and federal constitutional and case law, the
appeals court found that the random suspicionless drug testing policy
of the Vernonia School District was unconstitutional because it per-
mitted an unreasonable search that violated privacy rights guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and simi-
lar provisions of the Oregon Constitution. 8 In making this determi-
nation, the court applied a three-part analysis. It considered first
whether there was a "search" in the constitutional sense; second,
whether the executive official had the authority to perform the
search; 9 and finally, whether the search was reasonable.30 It con-
cluded that urinalysis does constitute a search under the Oregon Con-
stitution.31 Because the second part of the analysis was not challenged
on appeal, the court adopted the district court's finding that the Policy
was "properly authorized by a politically accountable body" since it
was adopted by a vote of the School Board.31
To determine whether the search was reasonable, the Ninth Circuit
relied on a balancing test applied in Delaware v. Prouse.33 The Court
in Prouse stated that "the permissibility of a particular law enforce-
ment practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate gov-
ernment interests. 34
In balancing the Vernonia School District's legitimate interest in a
drug-free student body against an individual's right to be free from
unreasonable searches, the court of appeals found that the balance of
interests weighed more heavily in favor of protecting constitutional
rights. It held that suspicionless drug testing was invasive, and that
while conditions in a locker room reduce expectations of privacy
somewhat, this is still a "far cry from having an authority figure watch,
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1527.
29. Id., at 1520. See also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juvenile Justice, 5 CruM. Just. 27 (1990)
for a discussion of the development of and concerns surrounding searches performed on
juveniles in civil and criminal settings.
30. Acton, 23 F. Supp. at 1519.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1521.
33. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
34. Id. at 654. The Court in Acton wrote that four considerations, no one of which is deter-
minative, could be distilled from Prouse. "(1) the importance of the government interests; (2)
the degree of physical and psychological intrusion on the citizen's rights; (3) the amount of dis-
cretion the procedure vests in individual officials; and (4) the efficiency of the procedure - that is
how well it contributes to the reaching of its purported goals and how necessary it is." Acton, 23
F.3d at 1522.
5
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listen to, and gather the results of one's urination."'3 It emphasized
the role of school boards in educating youth for citizenship, a role
which was "reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional free-
doms of the individual." 36
While drug use among young people is tragic, the Acton court found
no hazard extreme enough to warrant random suspicionless drug test-
ing,37 particularly since the goal of the Policy was not entirely clear to
the court. 8 The court questioned whether the purpose was to avoid
athletic injuries, in which case testing athletes was a reasonable way to
proceed, or whether the true goal was to reduce drug use in the gen-
eral student body, which meant that testing only the athletes was a
"considerably more roundabout way of reaching that goal. "39 The
court was not convinced that there was a causal relationship between
the implementation of the Policy and the subsequent reduction in
classroom misbehavior."n Therefore, it held the Policy to be invalid
under the Fourth Amendment, and was certain that the Oregon courts
would also find it invalid under its constitution.41
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision of
the court of appeals, holding that the latter Court's decision "rested
on a flawed premise"'42 and remanded the case to the court of appeals
for further proceedings. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated
that "the most significant element in this case is... that the Policy was
undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under
a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to
its care .... [S]o the relevant question is whether the search is one
that a reasonable guardian and tutor might undertake. '4 3 The Court
held that students in general and student-athletes in particular have a
lower expectation of privacy than members of the general popula-
tion,44 and that the drug testing program serves the important govern-
mental interest of preventing drug use by students.45
BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and its
state counterparts, guard citizens from the imposition of unreasonable
35. Acton, 23 F.3d 1514, 1525 (9th Cir. 1994).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1526.
38. Id. at 1522.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1527.
42. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995).
43. Id at 2396-97.
44. Id. at 2392-93.
45. Id. at 2395.
1996]
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searches of their persons, houses, papers, and effects.46 The Oregon
Constitution, using similar wording, offers virtually the same
protection.47
In rendering its decision in Acton, the court of appeals relied on
earlier Supreme Court cases which have examined the problem of
random suspicionless drug testing in the light of the Fourth Amend-
ment. In 1989, the Supreme Court decided two cases concurrently
which challenged the constitutionality of drug testing programs.
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n,4 employees of the
railroad association challenged a drug testing program that mandated
urine and blood testing after major train accidents.4 9 The program
also authorized railroad officials to administer urine or breath tests to
employees who violated specific safety regulations.50 The testing is
considered random and suspicionless because in the event of a major
accident, all members of the crew are tested whether there is suspicion
of a particular individual's responsibility for the accident.5 1
The Court determined that the "collection and subsequent analysis
of the biological samples... constitute[d] searches of the person sub-
ject to the Fourth Amendment" 52 despite the fact that such proce-
dures did not entail any intrusion into the body. 3 The Court noted
that a search of this nature intrudes on the expectations that people
have of privacy in their elimination functions. Additionally, chemical
analysis of urine can reveal medical information that individuals have
come to regard as personal and private, such as whether a person is
diabetic, epileptic, or pregnant.54
However, the Skinner Court noted that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only those that are
considered unreasonable.5 5 "What is reasonable, of course, depends
on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the
nature of the search or seizure itself." 56 Determining whether a pro-
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. OR CoNsT. art. I § 9.
48. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
49. Id. at 609. A "major train accident" was defined as one which involved either a fatality,
a release of a hazardous material requiring evacuation, or damage to railroad property in excess
of $500,000.
50. Id at 606.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 617.
55. Id. at 619 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).
See also William R. Brereton, Using the Reasonable Suspicion Standard To Maintain a Proper
Educational Environment To Educate Today's Youth - New Jersey v. T.L.O., 13 N. Ky. L. REv.
253 (1986) for a history of the development of the "reasonableness" standard.
56. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
7
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cedure is permissible involves balancing its intrusion on the individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.5 7
In Skinner, the government interest was in promoting safety, not
just of employees and passengers, but of the public at large. Having
ascertained that alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees posed
a serious threat to safety,58 drug testing on railroad employees was
implemented to protect the lives of employees and passengers, and to
reduce the property damage that results from train accidents.5 9
In the decision written by Justice Kennedy, the Court upheld the
drug testing program. Balancing the government's interest against the
individual's rights, the Court pointed out that this was an industry reg-
ulated pervasively to ensure safety, and one whose employees already
have reduced expectations of privacy." Further, the methods of col-
lecting the specimens provided the individuals with some measure of
privacy.61 The Court also determined that although a warrant and
probable cause are usually required in the absence of individual suspi-
cion of wrongdoing, a search still may be reasonable without a war-
rant and without individualized suspicion.62 For railroad employees
who have been involved in a serious accident, a warrant would serve
no purpose. Not only would requiring a warrant frustrate the objec-
tives of the government's testing program, but it would provide the
57. Id.
58. Id. at 606.
59. Id. at 621.
60. Id at 627. The Court wrote that the Secretary of Transportation is authorized by Con-
gress to test railroad facilities, equipment, operations, and persons as he or she deems necessary
to carry out the provisions of the Federal Railway Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. § 437(a)).
61. Id. at 626. Specimens were produced in a medical environment (similar to that of a
doctor's office), and the collection was supervised, but not directly observed, by personnel unre-
lated to the railroad, rather than by an employee's supervisor.
62. Id at 624. Searches and seizures are generally divided into two types. Those which are
performed in conjunction with criminal cases fall under the procedures developed from the War-
rant Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such searches usually require a judicial warrant
issued upon probable cause or a finding of an exception to the warrant requirements. See Skin-
ner, 489 U.S. at 619; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Exceptions are allowed when "special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Skin-
ner, 489 U.S. at 619. Searches which are not performed in conjunction with criminal cases are
considered to be administrative searches. See Acton, 23 F.3d at 1521; see also O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1986) (requiring an employer to obtain a warrant to enter an employee's
office or desk for a work-related purpose is unreasonable, and the appropriate standard for
administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional meaning); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (holding that traditional "probable cause" is not required in
automobile searches near the border because they are undertaken for primarily administrative
purposes rather than prosecutorial purposes); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (uphold-
mng New York's statute authorizing warrantless inspections of closely regulated businesses as
within the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches).
8
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individual with little, if any, additional protection. 3 The Court found
that the Railway Association's procedures constituted a reasonable
search.64
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,6" a decision
announced the same day as Skinner, the Court considered a challenge
to a policy requiring drug testing of customs officials who were seek-
ing transfers or promotion to certain positions. Utilizing the same bal-
ancing test as in Skinner, the Court held that the Customs Service was
justified in warrantless, suspicionless, random testing of those employ-
ees who were directly involved in drug interdiction, or whose jobs re-
quired them to carry firearms. 6 According to the Court, employees
who accept promotions to those positions should be tested because
they must make instantaneous life or death decisions, and because it
would be dangerous for an employee who has an addiction to be han-
dling the illicit drugs that the Customs Service seizes.67 However,
drug testing of employees who merely handle classified materials may
not be reasonable, and the Court remanded that part of the prior deci-
sion for further examination. 8 In determining that a warrant was
unnecessary, the Court found that "the traditional probable-cause
standard may be unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine
administrative functions... especially where the government seeks to
prevent the development of hazardous conditions .... -"69 The Court
concluded that the government's need to conduct the searches out-
weighed the privacy interests of the employees.70
Lower federal courts have approved drug testing on employees
when serious safety concerns were at issue or when national security
was at risk.7 1 These courts also used the balancing test to determine
whether the government's interest was substantial and therefore rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Drug testing usually has been up-
held when there is already a diminished expectation of privacy.72 On
63. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.
64. Id. at 633.
65. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
66. Id. at 672.
67. Id. at 660-61.
68. Id. at 665.
69. Id. at 668.
70. Id. at 672.
71. See AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991); IBEW, Local 1245 v.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1992).
72. See AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding drug testing
for employees required to pass a top security clearances and judged to have a reduced expecta-
tion of privacy); IBEW, Local 1245 v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1992) (upholding drug testing of gas pipeline workers); but see Harmon v. Thornburg, 878 F.2d
484 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding testing of attorneys who deal with top secret information, but
not those who deal mainly with grand juries and the prosecution of criminals).
9
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the other hand, drug testing has not been allowed where there was
merely a general interest in the integrity of the workforce.73
Prior to Acton, the Supreme Court had not considered the specific
issue of drug testing of student athletes, but some lower federal and
some state courts had done so. In Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Ruther-
ford Regional School District,74 the school administration attempted
to justify testing the entire student body for drugs as part of a required
annual physical exam.75 Administrators claimed that drug use is an
illness and, therefore, beyond the parameters of the laws regulating
searches and seizures. 76 The court held that to support such an idea
would suggest that medical testing is without limits,7 7 and it con-
cluded that the drug testing policy was unconstitutional.78 In Brooks
v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District, a student
brought a class action suit challenging a school's drug testing policy
which mandated the testing of all students who wished to participate
in any extracurricular activity.79 Brent Brooks, a high school senior in
a school district with no ascertainable sign of a drug problem, was
barred from participation in a Future Farmers of America competition
after he refused to provide a urine sample for testing.80 Brooks was
successful in getting a temporary restraining order against the school,
and in the subsequent trial, the court held that the intrusion on per-
sonal privacy which the school children were forced to undergo was
not justified by the goal of preventing substance abuse.8
At least one court has struck random suspicionless drug testing of
student athletes at the college level. In University of Colorado v.
Derdeyn, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the court of appeals'
73. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (prohibiting drug testing of correc-
tional employees who do not carry firearms or have regular access to prisoners). See also
O'Keefe v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 602 A.2d 760 (1992) (rejecting urine testing for water
meter readers or applicants for those jobs absent an individualized suspicion of drug use);
Romaguerra v. Gegenheimer, 798 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. La.1992) (permitting random drug testing
only of employees who operate motor vehicles and have direct and unsupervised access to
drugs); Georgia Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (striking the
state's pre-employment drug screening program upon a finding that a generalized interest in the
integrity of the workforce does not justify violation of Fourth Amendment rights of employees).
74. 510 A.2d 709 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1985).
75. The Introduction to the Board's policy stated in part:
These complete physical examinations will help to identify any drug and alcohol use by the
pupils. The detection of drug and/or alcohol use will enable the Board of Education to
enter the pupil into an appropriate rehabilitation program designed to help the student
recognize the danger and to remedy any problem that exists.
Id. at 710.
76. Id. at 711.
77. Id. at 713.
78. Id.
79. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
80. Id. at 760.
81. Id. at 766.
1996]
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decision that mandatory testing of student athletes was not constitu-
tional.8 Although it acknowledged the seriousness of drug abuse, the
court determined that "the University's interest in securing a drug-
free athletic program does not constitute a compelling state interest
which rises to the level required by Skinner and Von Raab."'83
Suspicionless drug testing has been upheld, however, in other cases
involving student athletes. In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School
Corporation, the court balanced the students' expectations of privacy
against the school's compelling interest in preventing drug-related in-
juries.8 In upholding the constitutionality of the school's drug testing
program, the court pointed to factors such as mandatory physical ex-
ams, the element of communal undress in locker rooms, and the high
visibility and pervasiveness of drug testing among professional, col-
legiate, and Olympic Game athletes.8 5
Federal courts have also considered whether students should be
granted fewer rights under the constitution than other citizens. In
New Jersey v. T.L. .,86 the Supreme Court found that "school chil-
dren have legitimate expectations of privacy" that need to be bal-
anced against "the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place." 7 The Court held that
the restrictions prohibiting warrantless searches should be -eased
somewhat to accommodate the nature of the school setting, and that
cases need to be decided based on the "reasonableness" test, examin-
ing all the relevant circumstances.8s In T.L.O., the search and seizure
was found to be constitutional, but it was neither random nor suspi-
cionless.8 9 .The Supreme Court has held that "students do not shed
their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse gate"9 But in apply-
ing the balancing and reasonableness tests, courts have frequently up-
held searches that have taken place on school grounds. 91
82. Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993) (en banc), aff'g 832 P2d 1031
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
83. I& at 1034-35.
84. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
85. 1d at 1318-19.
86. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 341-42.
89. Id. at 326. T.L.O. was caught smoking in the girl's restroom at school. A search of the
student's purse revealed a pack of cigarettes and a pack of rolling papers which the vice principal
associated with marijuana cigarettes. The Court held that this justified a further search, where-
upon more evidence of drug-related activity was discovered. Each search was held to be justi-
fied by "reasonable grounds" that school rules and/or the law had been broken.
90. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
91. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470,480 (5th Cir. 1982)
("Teachers and school officials must have broad supervisory and disciplinary powers"); Doe v.
Renfrou, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (upholding a search of high school students by drug
detecting dogs); In re Isiah B., 500 N.W. 2d 637 (Wis. 1993) (upholding a random search of
11
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While the issue of urine testing in Acton was a case of first impres-
sion for the Oregon Courts, the constitutionality of other types of
searches had been tested. For example, in State v. Tourtillott,92 the
court upheld the practice of stopping individuals at fixed game check-
points to check for hunting licenses, citing the reasonableness test de-
veloped in Delaware v. Prouse.93
ANALYSIS
When viewed in the light of earlier decisions, the holding of the
Ninth Circuit - to disallow urine testing on school children partici-
pating in sports programs - makes sense. The appeals court in Acton
followed the lead of the Supreme Court and drew a line, labeling this
search as unreasonable.94 When national security is at risk,95 when
lives could be endangered by an employee who is disoriented due to
drugs or alcohol,96 or when a person is responsible for seizing illegal
drugs smuggled into this country,97 testing body fluids is justified. In
other cases, searches are justified when there is probable cause or at
least reasonable suspicion.98 However, random testing of school chil-
dren where there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence of a drug
problem9 9 is not reasonable.
In Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,"° the school
district tried to justify testing anyone who participated in any extra-
curricular activity, despite the fact that a drug-sniffing dog uncovered
so little evidence of drugs on campus that the practice was discontin-
ued for lack of justification.10 1 In Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Ruther-
ford Regional Sch. Dist., the school system tried to impose an annual
urine test for drugs on the entire student body in a policy the court
called "an attempt to control student discipline under the guise of a
medical procedure, thereby circumventing strict due process require-
school lockers where there had been incidents of violence, and officials had been warned that
additional violence would take place. A gun and cocaine were discovered in Isiah B's locker.
92. 618 P.2d 423 (Or. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
93. Id. at 427. But see, Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1987) (holding that stop-
ping drivers at a roadblock violated the Oregon Constitution).
94. The Court in Acton relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner v. Railway La-
bor Executives, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989), and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Acton, 23 F.3d at 1520-26.
95. See AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. See Skinner, 469 U.S. at 602; Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power Dist. 844 F.2d 562 (8th
Cir. 1988).
97. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
98. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
99. In the first three weeks of testing, 110 student underwent urinalysis. Only two tested
positive, and they were high school, not grade school students. Respondents' Brief, 1995 WL
89313 at 20-21, Acton (No. 94-590).
100. 730 F. Supp. 759 (S. D. Tex.).
101. Id. at 761.
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ments."'1 2 In both cases, the courts correctly held that this level of
infringement on students' rights to privacy was too excessive even
when balanced against the administrations' legitimate interests in a
drug-free student body and their equally legitimate interest in promot-
ing school discipline. Being forced to urinate on demand while a
school monitor listens "for the normal sounds of urination"'1 3 is a se-
rious intrusion on an activity most people consider intensely private.
"Most people describe [the passing of urine] by euphemisms if they
talk about it at all .... [I]ndeed its performance in public is generally
prohibited by law as well as social custom."'' 04 The Acton court of ap-
peals was not convinced that student-athletes have lower expectations
of privacy than other students. "Training rules and grade point aver-
age requirements are not the sort of extensive government regulation
that [have] been found to diminish the expectation of privacy of work-
ers in high risk industries or high security areas of the government."' 10 5
While the Seventh Circuit upheld the drug testing program in
Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp.,1 0 6 there was strong evidence
of a pervasive drug problem in the school.107 Nevertheless, the court
of appeals in Acton felt that the Seventh Circuit had "unduly mini-
mized the privacy interests of the students" and bluntly stated that
"we simply do not agree with the Seventh Circuit."' 0 8
The appeals court in Acton came to the same conclusion as the
courts in Brooks and Odenheim. While deploring drug use among
young people, and acknowledging that school officials acted in good
faith, the court nonetheless emphasized the grave importance of dem-
onstrating to students that constitutionally granted rights should be
protected vigilantly. Otherwise, children will come to believe, at an
early age, that the constitution is merely a collection of meaningless
words.109 School boards can perform their important tasks within the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment. "That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitu-
tional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes." 110
102. 510 A.2d 709, 713 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1985).
103. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1517 (9th Cir. 1994).
104. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (1989).
105. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525.
106. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
107. Id. at 1310. When the problem was first discovered, sixteen students were tested - five
of the tests were positive.
108. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1527.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1525.
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The Supreme Court applied the same balancing test to the Acton
facts as had the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals; yet it reached an
entirely different conclusion."' The Supreme Court weighed the stu-
dents' privacy interests against the government's interest in a drug-
free population and concluded that the urine testing imposed on
school children by the Vernonia School District constituted a reason-
able search.
Justice Scalia wrote that the subjects of this search were children
who had been committed to "the temporary custody of the State as
schoolmaster."'' 2 Consequently, the government may exercise a
greater degree of supervision and control over them than would be
possible if the subjects were adults. 1 3 According to the Court, chil-
dren have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the general
population because they are required to submit to physical examina-
tions and vaccinations.1 4 Furthermore, student athletes have an even
lesser expectation of privacy than students who are not athletes due to
communal undress in locker rooms, pre-season physicals, and rules
which regulate their conduct.1 ' The Court labeled the privacy inter-
est compromised by the urine testing "negligible"'1 6 and "relative[ly]
unobtrusive ... ."I7 while calling the state's interest in deterring drug
use by school children "important" and "perhaps compelling. 11 8
Justice Scalia elaborated on the "compelling state interest"
standard.
It is a mistake... to think that the phrase "compelling state interest,"
in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quan-
tum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by
answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state inter-
est here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest which appears im-
portant enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of
other factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
genuine expectation of privacy." 9
In this case, the majority considered such factors as the government's
special responsibility of care and direction for school children and a
duty to protect them from drug-infested schools. 120
111. Acton, 115 S. CL 2386 (1995).
112. Id. at 2391.
113. Id. at 2392.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2393.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2396.
118. Id. at 2395.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Whether the Vernonia schools were drug-infested, however, was
one of the primary issues contested by the parties. The parties' briefs
indicate a strong difference of opinion concerning the seriousness and
scope of the drug situation in the Vernonia schools. The Actons per-
ceived it to be a relatively small problem,' 2' while the School District
concluded that drug abuse of epidemic proportions had invaded the
Vernonia schools."2 During oral arguments, the Justices repeatedly
questioned the parties about the extent of the drug problem, and spec-
ulated that perhaps this was more a situation of young people brag-
ging, rather than relating accounts of incidents which actually had
occurred. 125 The Supreme Court apparently found the argument of
the Petitioners to be more persuasive, calling the situation "an imme-
diate crisis of greater proportion than existed in Skinner... [a]nd of
much greater proportion than existed in Von Raab .... I
The Court also found the program imposed by the Policy to be suffi-
ciently tailored to meet the District's need to control drug use. "It
seems to us self-evident that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role
model' effect of athletes' drug use, and of particular danger to ath-
letes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use
drugs."'2 5
The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment does not require
a governmental body to use the least intrusive means to an end, even
if such a means is available. Although the Actons argued that drug
testing based on a suspicion of individualized drug use would provide
a less intrusive means of controlling drug use among students,' 26 the
Court considered such a plan to be impracticable, and speculated that
parents who had no objection to a program of random suspicionless
drug testing might object to accusatory drug testing "which transforms
the process into a badge of shame." 2 7 According to the Court, this
latter type of drug testing creates the risk that teachers would impose
arbitrary testing upon "troublesome but not drug-likely students.'
121. Respondents' Brief, 1995 WL 89313 at *2, Acton (No. 94-590) ("It is very important to
carefully describe Vernonia's drug 'problem' because the District persistently overstates it ....
In fact, there is little evidence of Vernonia's students using drugs, and no evidence of any athlete
in Vernonia ever competing while on drugs, let alone causing or sustaining injury.").
122. Brief of Petitioner Vernonia School District 47J, 1995 WL 13176 at *6, Acton (No. 94-
590) ("[T]he leading student athletes were actively involved with the school-wide drug problem
.... Drug and alcohol use pervaded the District's athletic programs."). See also Reply Brief of
Petitioner Vemonia School District 47J, 1995 WL 120204 at *2 ("More direct evidence of a drug
problem exists here than in Skinner .... ).
123. 1995 WL 353412 (U.S. Oral Arg.) at *3-4, 115 S. CL 2386 (1995).
124. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395.
125. Id. at 2396.
126. Respondent's Brief, 1995 WL 89313 at *45-46.
127. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
128. Id.
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While not minimizing the seriousness of the drug problem nation-
wide, Justice O'Connor, in her dissenting opinion, pointed out the
irony of the majority decision.129 The School District justified its Pol-
icy on evidence of misbehavior among identifiable students, and of
suspected drug use by student athletes who had been identified. 3 '
The Policy was proposed because the administration suspected there
was a correlation between the discipline problems in the classrooms
and reports of students glamorizing drug use.' Justice O'Connor
noted that the individualized suspicion requirement has "a legal pedi-
gree as old as the Fourth Amendment itself.' 32 "[I]n the area of in-
trusive personal searches, the only recognized exception [to a
requirement of a warrant and probable cause] is for situations in
which a suspicion-based scheme would be likely ineffectual." 33 Here,
a suspicion-based program might have been more effective.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that traditionally, the primary re-
quirement for reasonableness has been individualized suspicion.'3 4
"[W]hat the framers of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed
... were general searches ... .,,131 For most of this country's history,
"mass, suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ....
[E]xceptions [have been allowed] only where it has been clear that a
suspicion-based regime would be ineffectual .... [T]hat is not the case
here."'1 36 The potential subjects of the search within the Vernonia
schools could be and in fact were readily identified by classroom
teachers and coaches.
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion is supported by the Court's
decision in New Jersey v. T.L. O137 finding reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify a search of a student's purse for cigarettes after the student was
caught smoking. Justice O'Connor pointed out that the Court should
not abandon the requirement of individualized suspicion, which is
129. Id at 2397. (O'Connor, J., dissenting. Justices Stevens and Souter joined in Justice
O'Connor's dissent. "[Tihe police cannot ... subject to drug testing every person entering or
leaving a certain drug-infested neighborhood in order to find evidence of crime .... even though
it is hard to think of a more compelling government interest than the need to fight the scourge of
drugs on our streets and in our neighborhoods." Id. at 2400).
130. Acton, 23 F.3d 1514, at 1516 ("[O]ne teacher had often seen students smoking mari-
juana during the school day at a coffee shop across the street from the high school.").
131. Id. ("An English teacher received several essays describing and glorying in scenes of
student drug and alcohol use.").
132. Acton, 115 S. CL at 2403.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2401. "[S]ome quantum of individualized suspicion is usually required under the
Fourth Amendment." Skinner v. Railway Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 624 (quoting United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976)).
135. Id. at 2398.
136. Id.
137. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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usually required for an intrusive personal search. A suspicion-based
scheme is not likely to lead to testing students whose misbehavior is
-induced by something other than drug use because the required level
of suspicion in a school setting is "objectively reasonable suspi-
cion."13 "Moreover, any distress arising from what turns out to be a
false accusation can be minimized by keeping the entire process confi-
dential."' 39 A suspicion-based drug testing scheme would be a minor
addition to the adversarial disciplinary methods schools have tradi-
tionally used.140
The Court in T.L.O.1' held that determining whether searching
school children is reasonable involves a two-fold inquiry:
[F]irst, one must consider "whether the.., action was justified at its
inception;" second, one must determine whether the search as actually
conducted was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place." Under ordinary cir-
cumstances a search of a student by a teacher or other school official
will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of
the infraction.' 42
Had this test been applied to Acton, it is likely that random suspi-
cionless testing would have been disallowed. Instead, a program
could have been designed which required only those students who vio-
lated school disciplinary rules and who were suspected of drug abuse
to be tested for illicit drug use. Such a policy would have eliminated,
or at least seriously reduced, the testing of Vernonia students who
were not causing the disciplinary problems.
Justice O'Connor pointed out that suspicion-based searches pose a
lesser threat to liberty tha do mass suspicionless ones which can in-
volve thousands or millions of searches.' 43 In Carroll v. United
States,'44 decided during the days of Prohibition, the Court refused to
admit evidence from random searches of automobiles made by agents
looking for alcohol, calling such searches "intolerable and unreasona-
ble." 45 The Court reasoned that most of the people stopped and sub-
138. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 469 U.S. at 341-42 (citations omitted).
142. Id.
143. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (citing Illinois v. KrulI, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)).
144. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
145. Id. at 153- 54.
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jected to such searches wouldhave been using the public roads for
lawful purposes.146 The Court has also held that pat-downs for weap-
ons of all patrons in a bar where there was probable cause to suspect
drug trafficking was not a reasonable search. 47 Nor can the police
subject every person entering or leaving a drug-ridden neighborhood
to a search in order to find evidence of a crime.148 It is likely that a
suspicion-based drug testing program would have solved Vernonia's
problem, while at the same time preserving the right of James Acton
and his fellow student athletes to be free from unreasonable searches.
Furthermore, the Vernonia Policy fails the 'scope' test of T.L.O. be-
cause the search is not reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the invasion of the privacy interest. The Policy
originated due to an increase in conduct problems believed to be
caused by substance abuse. A program which tests only those stu-
dents who are disciplinary problems almost certainly would be smaller
in scope than the random testing of athletes. Under Vernonia's Policy,
non-athletes who are drug-users and discipline problems may never be
tested, while completely innocent students who have never used ille-
gal substances may be forced to produce urine samples repeatedly.
Finally, the Policy fails the scope test in that it does not provide for the
detection of alcohol, 14 9 which is the substance most likely to be
abused by students.150
CONCLUSION
In our country, one of our most fundamental beliefs is that people
who allegedly have committed crimes should be considered innocent
until proved guilty. Random, suspicionless, warrantless drug testing
of school children is misguided. It is on the wrong side of the line that
separates reasonable searches from unreasonable ones. It starts with
the assumption that someone - in this case a child - has committed
a wrong. The child is presumed guilty until he or she agrees to
demonstrate his or her innocence over and over by submitting to inva-
sive urinalysis repeatedly throughout a sports season. If the student
146. Id.
147. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
148. See 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARcH AND SmzutRE § 9.5(b), pp. 551-53 (2d ed. 1987).
149. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, 1995 WL 353412, at *18-20, Acton
(No. 94-590).
150. "A USA Today survey of almost 800 high school coaches asked what they considered
the greatest threat to athletes on their teams. Eighty-eight percent indicated that alcohol was
the greatest threat, 6% cracklcocaine, 3% marijuana, and 1% steroids." Andrew T. Pittman,
Drug Testing of High School Athletes After Vernonia, 104 ED. LAW REP. 15 (1995).
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refuses to provide continuous proof of innocence, he or she is pun-
ished by being disqualified from participation in athletic programs.' 5 '
It is significant that school officials justify these searches on the ba-
sis of promoting student safety. But, ironically there is no indication
that the adults involved in running and managing the sports programs
in the Veronia School District - coaches, referees, and bus drivers -
had volunteered or were willing to be tested for drug abuse for the
sake of student safety. All of those adults play a significant role in the
safety of students in general, and athletes in particular. An impaired
bus driver could easily be a greater risk to students' lives than an im-
paired athlete.
The majority based its decision partially on the subjective assump-
tion that students have a reduced expectation of privacy because they
submit to an annual physical. This is an assumption with which most
students would disagree. It further raises the question of whether any
adult who gets an annual physical is impliedly agreeing to allow the
government to search his or her urine randomly for indications of Me-
gal drug use.
Americans think they place a high value on the right to privacy, but
the Constitution's chief bulwark against government snooping is being
steadily dismantled, with enthusiastic support from the public. [The]
Supreme Court decision upholding drug testing for adolescent athletes
in public schools is the latest diminution of personal sovereignty in the
name of greater safety.' 52
It remains to be seen whether the imposition of drug testing on stu-
dent athletes will be an effective weapon in the nation's war on drugs.
The drug education coordinator for the National Federation of High
School Associations (NFHSA) does not think so, if for no other rea-
son than the cost.'5 3 In 1994, the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation (NCAA) spent $2.1 million on drug testing.'- 4 While the NCAA
has approximately 1,000 member schools, the NFHSA has 18,000
member schools.' 55 There are approximately 18 million children in
public school in grades seven through twelve.15 6 The cost of imple-
menting drug testing programs for so many student athletes will likely
151. Respondent's Brief, 1995 WL 89313 at *36. "Community life in Vernonia revolves
around school activities with sports events playing a center role. To be denied the right to par-
ticipate in school sports is, in effect, to be excluded in part from the community. That cannot be
viewed as anything but punishment." Id. at *63.
152. Stephen Chapman, Students Find Themselves Going Back to the Future of "1984," PORT-
LAND OREGONiAN, July 1, 1995, at D9.
153. Brad McCray, Ruling Probably Will Have Little Effect, PoRTAND OREroN4aN, July 5,
1995, at C7.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (citing U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics 58 (1994) (Table 43)).
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prevent it from becoming standard practice. Several delegates to a
recent meeting of the NFHSA concurred, believing that mandatory
drug testing of high school athletes is not the best tool, and that edu-
cational programming may still provide the best prevention.'5 7
Although Justice Scalia now considers a search of a student's urine
a "negligible' '158 intrusion on privacy, in his dissent in Von Raab writ-
ten only five years ago, he objected to urine testing of U.S. Custom's
agents, calling it a "type of search particularly destructive of privacy
and offensive to personal dignity."' 59 Most adolescents - much more
insecure about their bodies and bodily functions than adults160  _
would probably relate more closely to his earlier philosophy than his
current characterizing of this kind of intrusion as negligible. Suspi-
cionless drug testing should not be the weapon of choice for control-
ling drug use in our schools. In the absence of a safety or security risk
of the magnitude of a train wreck or a prison control problem, there
should be some evidence or at least some suspicion of individualized
wrongdoing. A student should not be tested routinely or randomly,
but only when there is reason to believe that he or she is impaired.
Schools need to find other ways, more compatible with educational
institutions, to prevent drug abuse.
As Justice Marshall, dissenting in Skinner, said,
The issue.., is not whether declaring a war on illegal drug use is good
public policy .... Rather, the issue here is whether the government's
deployment in that war of a particularly Draconian weapon - the
compulsory collection and chemical testing of... blood and urine -
comports with the Fourth Amendment .... [W]hen we allow funda-
mental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exi-
gency, we invariably come to regret it.' 6'
KAT.R~m J.M. CHESTER*
157. McCray, supra note 153.
158. 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
159. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia also stated, "In my view, the Customs Service rules are a kind of
immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use." Id. at 681.
160. According to a female student athlete, "You kind of got flippant about it [urine testing]
after a while because it was so embarrassing and everybody had to do it so we made jokes about
it so that, you know, it wouldn't be as bad." University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 931
(1993).
161. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
* Dedicated to the memory of my parents, who taught me, among other things, not to
split infinitives and dangle participles. Requiescant in pacem.
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